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The essay grew out of Hannah Arendt’s reflection on the roles and uses of the mask, a 
meditation on the ontology of the transient public figure or persona vs. one that 
restitutes the person to the unadulterated Selbstdenken dimension of the Epicurean 
philosopher-in-hiding. The author individuates in the resulting caesura between the 
donning and the taking off of the mask the primal source of that paradox in Hanna 
Arendt’s political behavior that alternately compelled her to confront the ontological 
presence of the Palestinian people, and made her withdraw into philosophical hiding 
without ever really coming to terms with it. In her writings, the Palestinians are never 
protagonists, rarely enjoy supporting roles, and most of the time remain 
unfortunate extras on a stage controlled by external actors who, sustained by the 
imperialist powers, suddenly donned their masks making themselves protagonists on 
a stage that was not theirs. To illuminate Arendt’s conceptual trajectory the author 
adopts as his guiding signposts W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz (2003), Palestinian artist 
Larissa Mansour’s Nation Estate (2013), Emily Horne’s and Tim Maly’s work The 
Inspection House (2014),and Hermann Broch’s The Death of Virgil. The adverb 
‘towards’ in the title points to a path that has remained, as a result, without 
destination in Hanna Arendt’s political activity and philosophical thought pivoting 
around the native people of Palestine. 
 
Keywords:  Jewish Philosophy, Zionism, Palestinians, Nationalism, Political Science, 
German Literature, Palestinian Art, German Philosophy, Social Control, the State. 
 
 
1. Hanna Arendt and the Mask: 
 
Responsibility and Judgment (2003) opens with the speech that Hannah Arendt 
delivered in Denmark in 1975 on the occasion of her acceptance of the Sonning Price 
“I have great confidence in Lessing’s  
Selbstdenken, for which, I think, no ideology, 
no public opinion and no ‘convictions’ can  
ever be a substitute.”  
 Hanna Arendt, 
          The Jewish Writings, p. 4701    
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and that now heads the collection as its Prologue.  As Jerome Kohn notes in the 
introduction, here the Jewish philosopher “performed in public the rare and difficult act 
of self-judgment” by making the ability to judge dependent on “the self-understanding 
of the judge” (p. XXXII). How could Arendt, a “Jew feminini generis,” as she defined 
herself in the speech, whom the public nature of the event had implicated as a person, 
respond to public recognition? (pp. 4, 12). An honor thus bestowed, she said, implies 
that “we are not fit to judge our accomplishments as we judge those of others.” Then, 
how could she both judge herself and be capable of self-understanding?  
 She attacked the issue by reflecting that “I have always believed that no one can 
know himself, for no one appears to himself as he appears to others” (p. 7). Finally, she 
resolved her dilemma by first grounding judgment in the response Socrates received 
from the Delphic oracle; then she linked the Apollonian exhortation of “Know Thyself” 
to the metaphorical use the Romans made of the word persona. Thus, the identifiable 
mask (persona) that actors wore on the stage and through which they literally sounded 
(per-sonare) their “somehow definable” voice, she said, later passed into the lexicon of 
juridically defined concepts of Roman law.  Having received its “specific weight” the 
Latin word now upgraded personae to persons who were identifiable by the civil rights 
they publicly wielded “in sharp distinction from the word homo, denoting someone who 
was nothing but a member of the human species” (p. 12).  
 As she reflected on the metaphorical process underlying the historical 
assumption on the part of the word persona of exclusively legal meaning, Arendt 
extended the metaphorical possibilities of the word persona even further: “metaphors 
being the daily bread of all conceptual thought” (p. 13). She could now compare the 
ambivalent mask of ancient times with the one which Arendt had to wear on that day–
she, a reluctant public person by trade who was suddenly “transformed” by the decision 
of the Danish award committee into a public figure through “the rather startling news of 
your decision” (p. 3).  She brought this logic to its terminus in her concluding remarks. 
She felt happy because “when the events for which the mask was designed are over, and 
I have finished using and abusing my individual right to sound through the mask, things 
will again snap back into place” (p. 14). What had begun with an apprehensive 
reluctance to betray Epicurus’ lathe biosas injunction to “live in hiding” had been 
salvaged now by a re-course to the ideal of the bios theoretikos that had informed her 
entire life as a philosopher. At last she felt “free not only to exchange the roles and 
masks that the great play of the world may offer, but free even to move through that play 
in my naked ‘thisness,’ identifiable, I hope, but not definable and not seduced by the 
great temptation of recognition which, in no matter what form, can only recognize us as 
such and such, that is, as something which we fundamentally are not” (p. 14). These 
remarkable words concluded her speech in 1975, the year she died.  
 That Hannah Arendt would look forward to the moment in which “things will 
again snap back into place” captures a reluctance that her biographers have long 
noticed. Disinclination to stand tall within the public space in order to take in at one 
glance the entire polis notoriously runs against Aristotle’s premises according to which 
the human being is naturally constituted as a political/social animal. This is, after all, 
the condition for philosophical theoria and political praxis. For beyond this fact lies a 
caesura at the opposite ends of which that configuration can only realize itself either as 
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a beast or as a god, “who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is 
either a bad man or above humanity” (Aristotle p. 1988).   
 One may be tempted to locate precisely between those two fines delimiting the 
caesura the two moments which Arendt terms identifiable and definable, a gap rendered 
more sibylline, as we saw above, by the addition of the adverb “somewhat.”  As we go 
over the speech, something seems not to be happening in our transition from what we 
fundamentally are (which makes us definable) to what we fundamentally are not (but 
which makes us identifiable); in other words, between the non-public moment in which 
our voice is at rest but is philosophically active and with no need for masks, and the 
public moment in which we sound that very voice through the mask to echo our 
philosophical ‘thisness.’  
 What is then definable for Arendt? Jerome Kohn’s comment on the speech is 
illuminating: “It is hard to imagine how Arendt could have suggested more 
transparently that the judge cannot be severed from the self-less actor, whose 
uniqueness appears only to others, as his inner, invisible, audible other side” (p. 
XXXIII). It is only during the public moment, precisely when we don both the mask and 
the judge’s mantle, that something new and irreversible takes place and we finally raise 
ourselves to the point in which judging and self-judging become possible, something 
unknown, needless to say, to the philosopher-in-hiding. Elsewhere, in his introduction 
to The Jewish Writings—the collection he edited of Hanna Arendt’s ‘Jewish’ articles—
Jerome Kohn adds post-mortem as one more dimension to the geometric flatland 
envisioned by our philosopher when he optimistically finds that “since her death, 
Arendt’s voice has become ever more identifiable” (p. XXIX).  He can celebrate now the 
virtuosity she displayed as she sounded her voice through her many masks (p. XXIX). 
How does this virtuosity of donning and taking off the mask work politically vis-à-vis 
both Zionism and the Palestinians? For this we turn to The Jewish Writings.  
 Here we soon run into the paradox of the natives as extras. Biographer Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl recounts one of the events in which things seemed to have happily 
“snapped back” and which occurred in November 1948 when Arendt joined the Judah 
Magnes Foundation but “would not accept its leadership” (Young-Bruehl 1982, 233) 
Laconically Arendt wrote to Elliot Cohen, “I am not qualified for any direct political 
work.” She went further, “I do not enjoy to be confronted with the mob, am much too 
easily disgusted, have not enough patience for maneuvering, and not enough 
intelligence to maintain a certain necessary aloofness.…”  She concludes with a thought 
that signals total retreat but also denotes bourgeois largesse, “it would definitely spoil 
my work as a writer.”  To be sure, when the moment had called for action she had 
promptly responded with some of the most prominent Jewish intellectuals of the time.  
Among these was a very vocal Albert Einstein who wrote a letter to the New York Times 
protesting the visit to America of “Jewish terrorist Menachem Begin.” The letter 
compared the Jewish Revisionists and their activities against Palestinians “to the Nazi 
and Fascist Parties, and repudiated the blend in their ideology of ‘ultra-nationalism, 
religious mysticism and racial superiority’.” Arendt had joined arms with them, but then 
she withdrew into her shell as she was finally shouted down by a hostile audience in 
Massachusetts.  
 This and other events epitomized for her, as she wrote in the same letter to 
Cohen, “the welter of superstition and mean savagery...plain stupidity and plain 
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wickedness” characteristic of Revisionist Jewish terror in Palestine (Young-Bruehl 1982, 
pp. 232-233, 513). In August of that same year, it is well to remember, she had refused 
“to be put forward as a possible chairman” to represent Magnes’ Ihud party as a 
negotiating group at the time when a possible UN trusteeship over Palestine was still on 
the table. Anticipating here what, exactly, Hannah Arendt truly wished for Palestine, it 
seems that every time she confronted what she saw as the “racist chauvinism” of 
Zionism she also kept coming closer to a recognition of the philosophical demands 
posed by the ontological existence of a Palestinian persona. She spoke of “the Jewish 
master race” doomed “not to conquest but suicide by its protagonists.” She had vitriolic 
words for Jewish leaders who “can threaten mass suicide to the applause of their 
audiences, and the terrible and irresponsible ‘or else we shall go down’ creeps into all 
official Jewish statements, however radical or moderate their sources” (p. 229).  Yet, as 
soon as she seemed to approximate that recognition of a co-equal, Palestinian persona 
wielding at least as valid rights to appear on the stage as a protagonist of the drama that 
had been unfolding since Balfour, Arendt sounded an ominous and self-defacing retreat. 
If allowed on the movie set at all, it seems, Palestinians could only appear in the guise of 
multitudes of fast moving, vociferous but voiceless, mask-less “extras” with no civic 
rights. Dura lex sed lex? 
 Hannah Arendt, of course, was not alone in taking a paradoxical stance on 
Palestine.   On the one hand, in fact, the courage shown by her and other liberal and 
leftist Jewish public figures in protesting and condemning Zionist excesses and crimes 
against the Palestinian population certainly foregrounds her deeply moral and intensely 
intellectual commitment. Her remarkable political position—and here we come to the 
crux of her paradoxical stance—appears all the more so, precisely when measured 
against her Western cultural prejudices which she saw virulently exacerbated in that 
“mystical, fascist, Jewish master race” brand of Zionism which was Jabotinsky’s and 
Begin’s Revisionist movement.  
 At bottom, though, in spite of all this open radical critique, Hannah Arendt did 
share with it fundamentally Western cultural prejudices against the people of the region 
without much philosophical self-introspection.1 Because of these biases she never came 
to terms with the very nature of Zionist ideology as “typical settler consciousness and 
imagination” (Piterberg 2008, p. XII). Instead, she admired this settler colonialism 
describing those Jews just arrived in Palestine as “the most advanced and Westernized 
people of the region”  (Arendt 2006, p. 424). As a corollary to these prejudices, Arendt 
and Zionism also routinely applied a vocabulary and analytical categories taken 
wholesale out of their foundational European experience and which could not describe 
the new historical conditions of Jews in Palestine.2 Among these are the use of the word 
‘pogrom’ to refer to Palestinian attacks against the Jewish coloniae and the labeling of 
the incumbent War of 1948 as “another catastrophe” (i.e., another Holocaust).  
                                                          
1 For an in-depth treatment of Western ideological forms and imperialism see the classical statement on 
the subject formulated by Edward Said in his opus comprising The Question of Palestine, Orientalism, 
Culture and Imperialism, and Blaming the Victims.   
2 See G. Piterberg, The Returns of Zionism (2008). 
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 No unprejudiced realization, of course, that this possible catastrophe could not 
possibly be another Nazi Holocaust would have diminished Jewish fears at the time.  Its 
prejudiced assumption that allowed for that equation does, however, betray a deeply 
ingrained cultural mindset and approach that shifted the very real Jewish-Palestinian 
hostilities to a totally different historical and geo-political context with which 
Palestinians had (and still have) nothing to do. It seems that in her mind Palestinian 
reactions and motivations were totally assimilated to the very different history of 
Europe which, evidently, functions in her political imaginary as a universal standard. 
The danger here obviously is the maladroit equation between European oppression of 
Jews and Palestinians and Arabs’ resistance against a foreign/Zionist takeover of their 
lands. Again, in her writings the war of 1948 lends itself to another comparison: “The 
last war showed all too clearly that no better pretext or greater help exist for would-be 
aggressors than petty national conflicts fought out in chauvinist violence.” Here she 
condemns the peoples of the Middle East as “aggressors” comparing them to the small 
nations of Central and Eastern Europe “who show such a disturbing resemblance in 
psychology and political mentality” (p. 426).  
 Jerome Kohn synthesizes her approach when he comments that “Arendt 
recognizes that Arab policies were equally blind in not recognizing the needs and 
concrete achievements of the Zionists in Palestine” (p. LX).3 It is this very Euro-colonial 
approach that constantly pre-empted Arendt’s very hopes in a Jewish-Palestinian 
collaboration on which, as we will see in a moment, she staked all her best hopes. For in 
spite of her repeated assertions in favor of it, her Western biases and colonialist 
Eurocentric frame of mind held her very political hopes back. On this cultural and 
political basis, one wonders, when leafing through Hannah Arendt’s Jewish Writings, 
what chances she could have ever given the Yishuv, the Jewish colonia in Palestine, as 
the redemptive locus in which Jewish history would free itself of those long Euro-
Christian centuries of colonial segregation, oppression, and outright murder. And yet, it 
was precisely because of these Euro-colonial biases that she could envision another 
people’s non-Western land to play out the redemptive role for Jewish history, a stolen 
protagonism that turned the native Palestinian Arabs into extras.  
 At the same time, these same biases did not prevent the great Jewish philosopher 
and political scientist, the author of The Human Condition and The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, to put forth good, even ominously prophetic, real Politik arguments in 
favor of collaboration between Jews and Palestinians. Ron H. Feldman comments in his 
Introduction to The Jewish Writings that “the inalterable fact of the Near East was that 
the Arabs were the Jews’ neighbors” (p. LX). This downgrading of Arabs to being 
“neighbors of” Jews brings home the very real political shift in historical protagonism 
that had taken place by then.  Ironically, the new protagonist, Arendt warned, might not 
be able to stand on its own feet with its neighbors, now still duly kept at a safe distance 
when the British would pull out.  Then what? Feldman rephrases Arendt’s line of 
thought succinctly when he adds that “to preserve the Jewish homeland in Palestine the 
Jews had the choice of either working out an agreement with the Arabs or seeking 
                                                          
 3 For an editorial discussion of Arendt’s Jewish Writings, see G. Piterberg, The Returns of Zionism 
(2008). 
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protection of one of the great imperial powers.” This, however, he points out, Arendt 
rejects because in choosing the latter a Jewish state would become “farcical and even 
self-defeating in so far the state would be a bastion of imperial interests in an area 
striving to liberate itself from colonialism.”  
 Indeed The Jewish Writings show an Arendt deeply aware of the fact that “the 
Jews ignored the awakening of colonial peoples and the new nationalist solidarity in the 
Arab world from Iraq to French Morocco” (p. 424).  In the end, would a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine survive as part and parcel of genuine concerted efforts with the 
active participation of the native people of the region as co-protagonists to establish a 
new post-colonial nation?  This is precisely, as Gabriel Piterberg shows, what her 
Marxist new friend Heinrich Blücher had passionately advocated in a letter he wrote her 
in 1936:  
 
 Let us join forces with the Arab workers and labourers to  
 liberate the land from the English plunderers and  
 the Jewish bourgeoisie that is in alliance with them.  
 Then you will receive your share, and the revolutionaries  
 of the whole world will guarantee it to you. That is  
 materialistic workers’ politics. (Piterberg 2007, p. 43)  
 
This, however, would never be her kind of politics, as Kohn shows, even as she 
recognized in her response to that letter that “Palestine is not at the centre of our 
national aspirations because 2,000 years ago some people lived there from whom in 
some sense or other we are supposed to be descended.” That land, in her thinking at the 
time, was “unavoidably bound with our past” on the wave of Herder’s mystical 
nationalist line which she cites in a larmoyant tone, ‘the ruins of Jerusalem are, as you 
could say, rooted in the heart of time.’ (Arendt 2007, p. XVIII). By the way, this was the 
same kind of German romantic nationalism, often racially defined, against which she 
later roared when she found it morphed into the Jewish Revisionists’ ideology.  
 Instead of a Jewish-Palestinian workers’ front, Arendt envisioned “local self-
governing and mixed Jewish-Arab municipal and rural councils, on a small scale and as 
numerous as possible.” Were these “the only realistic political measures that can 
eventually lead to the political emancipation of Palestine”?  Or, would the ‘preservation 
of the Jewish homeland in Palestine’ have to rely primarily on imperialism to impose on 
the ground a different, one-sided, farcical, self-defeating, inappropriate ‘nation-state’ 
solution as she had warned against?  Clearly, for Arendt it was not a revolutionary 
Jewish-Arab collaboration at the grassroots level in the sense indicated by Blücher that 
held a possible common Jewish-Palestinian project together, but it was reliance on the 
two superpowers of the moment who graciously chose to play the role of prime movers 
in Palestine that would save the day:  
 
 The state of Israel owes its very existence to these two  
 world powers….the great fortune of the Jews as well as  
 Arabs at this moment is that America and Great  
 Britain not only have no interest in further hostilities,  
 but, on the contrary, are genuinely eager to bring  
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 about an authentic pacification of the whole region. (p. 427)  
 
And yet, she never supported a Jewish nation state for the whole of Palestine either–in 
fact, she never embraced the widespread Zionist slogan that defined Jews “a people 
without a land in search of a land without a people” and which she dubbed a “fairy-tale” 
(p. XXX). How do we understand this contradictory position?  
 Caught between Herderian mysticism and philosophical rationalism, Arendt dons 
the philosophical mask on the stage of history to sound through it both her 
fundamentally mystical acceptance of Jewish history as reconstructed à la Herder and 
her acceptance of Palestine as the mystical locale in which Jews can act as protagonists 
with the Palestinians as unavoidable extras. Her Western colonial and chauvinistic 
cultural prejudices together with her enthusiastic adhesion to imperialism as a way to 
enforce philosophical praxis on non-Western peoples made it possible for Arendt to 
steal for herself and “her” people a Palestinian stage that did not belong to either of 
them. As a result, the native Palestinian Arabs are kicked off their own stage and see 
themselves forcibly lowered to the status of mask-less, self-less extras. What, then, is–in 
Hannah Arendt’s mind—the philosophical substance of donning and the taking off of 
the mask? Isn’t this paradox the philosophical gap or interstice wherein she recasts 
nonchalantly the natives of Palestine as extras? Clearly, we need more perspective, and 
for this we turn to the creatures of the night. 
 
2. Two constructions of the imagination to produce unfalsch perspectives:  
 
In the first pages of the last novel of his life, Austerlitz (2003), W. G. Sebald 
describes the protagonist’s visit to the Nocturama of Antwerp during the 1960s during 
one of his various travels. As the reader’s eyes become word after word progressively 
attuned to the chiaroscuro of the place, the difference between author, narrator, and 
reader blur into one triadic persona without any warning. A Waschbär (literally, a 
washing bear), a raccoon really, suddenly takes up the philosophical stage, and it is 
then that a series of baffling reflections texture the printed page only once bluntly 
interrupted by four small rectangular black and white piercing photos sporting 
inquisitively penetrating eyes of two birds atop the page in perfect symmetry with the 
two pictures of four human equally penetrating eyes below them. Two of these belong to 
the well-known painter and a friend of Sebald’s, Jan Peter Tripp; the other two eyes 
clearly are Ludwig Wittgenstein’s.  These pictures keep frozen in time the eyes of 
painters and philosophers “who strive to pierce the darkness around us by means of 
pure looking and thinking” (“vermittels der reinen Anschauung und des reinen 
Denkens”).   
 A nocturama, what better public place to host philosophy!  The triadic persona 
keeps watching the Waschbär for a long time as it sits with a serious looking face near a 
rivulet intent on washing the same piece of an apple–after all, this is a little washing 
bear!–in the irrational hope (“weit über jede vernüftige Gründlichkeit”) that this act will 
sooner or later land it outside of the unreal (falsch ) world into which it somehow has 
fallen through no fault of its own (“gewissermaßen ohne sein eigenes Zutun”). What 
would happen if, all of a sudden, the light went on in this place as the night fell in the 
world and then it arose again next day on this upside-down artificial mini-oecumene 
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and the creatures inside went to sleep: would they, could they, fall asleep with a sense of 
peace at heart? (“beruhigt in den Schlaf sinken”)? (p. 10 -12).  
 The whole Nocturama experience, with the raccoon yearning to wash away the 
falsch world in which it is somehow (“gewissermaßen”) stuck and the intellectual’s 
unrelenting eyes intent on piercing the darkness that envelopes the world, calls to mind 
another mechanical construction of the human imagination, one which intellectuals 
from another pained part of the world, occupied Palestine, have imagined. A young 
Palestinian woman born in Jerusalem in 1973, Larissa Sansour, uses photography, 
video, and installation “to reflect on the contemporary history and political situation of 
Palestine through the imaginative genre of science fiction” (Kana’an, Home Ground p. 
34).   
 Intriguingly, I saw one of Sansour’s installations, Nation Estate (2012), at the 
Aga Khan Museum in Toronto. It is part of Home Ground, an art exhibition featuring 
the work of 11 other contemporary Arab artists. Unaware, there I stepped into my own 
Nocturama just as Austerlitz’s persona did into his.  Nation Estate is a work in which 
Sansour imagines a futuristic high-tech skyscraper that lodges the entire Palestinian 
population. Each floor houses a different Palestinian city. An elevator connects all of 
them “making inter-city trips easy and convenient.” The project reflects on the shrinking 
of Palestinian territories caused by Israeli settlements and addresses “the growing lack 
of physical connections between Palestinain lands.” Exhibition curator Suheyla Takesh 
compares Sansour’s work to Camus’ actors in The Myth of Sisyphus who are “divorced 
from their settings,…alienated from their surroundings, and distanced from what feels 
natural.” The lobby of each floor in the skyscraper sports famous Palestinian landmarks 
“aiming to recreate a familiar environment and generate a sense of belonging in its 
residents.” This art project complete with digitally constructed images also shows a 
video in which a pregnant woman–interestingly, Sansour acting as herself–walks 
through the skyscraper back to her apartment. In the last scene, we see her looking at 
the actual city of Jerusalem outside the Estate with her hands on her belly and a worried 
look on her face. As with W. G. Sebald, to gain a per-spective based on “vernüftige 
Gründlichkeit”  in today’s social world, so fundamentally falsch, one evidently needs 
more than one technical medium to pierce through it.   
 Both of these authors’ philosophical reflections are rooted in their respective 
personal and painful experience. In the case of Larissa Sansour, it is the wholesale 
occupation of Palestine in a world complicit with it; in G.W. Sebald’s, it is instead the 
equally surreal lifelong effort to lift the veil of silence spread over post-world war 
Germany around the Shoah, the Holocaust, and to come to terms in the land of his birth 
with the heinous Nazi atrocities perpetrated against millions of European Jews. Both 
narrative threads bring up for reflection several themes that structure a world that 
reveals itself to us through astonishingly complex and contradictory perspectives in 
which reality and un-reality mirror each other, subject and object mutually exchange 
place, outside and inside collapse into one another, with the vain chimera looming on 
the horizon of a final possible erasure of any dualism at the end of a mathematical 
series. All of these point to a fundamental Lukacsian disconnect, or caesura, between a 
world of reason and one that destroys it, or, more precisely, between a world that tends 
towards social liberation and one which imperialist interests endlessly reproduce as 
falsch.   
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 A good modern example that illustrates how imperialism does this so ‘rationally’ 
an ‘innocently’ can be learned by taking another type of nocturnal tour, led this time 
around by Emily Horne and Tim Maly in their joint study titled The Inspection House: 
an Impertinent Field Guide to Modern Surveilance (2014). They trace modern 
surveillance systems to Jeremy Bentham’s mechanical panopticon: “a ring of cells 
observed by a central watchtower, as a labour-saving device. While his design was for a 
prison, he believed it would benefit other places: factories, poorhouses, hospitals, 
schools” (from the back cover). Michel Foucault, they argue, elevated this ingenious 
proto-type mechanism to “governing metaphor” in his Discipline & Punish: the Birth of 
the Prison (p. 17).  Clary Shirky’s comments on the book sound as eerily, “Someone you 
can’t see is watching you.”  She concludes tersely that it is this panopticon, “built in our 
name, that we all inhabit” (from the back cover). Still wondering about what it is like to 
be stuck in this kind of reality, “gewissermaßen ohne sein eigenes Zutun”? Although the 
Washbär and the Palestinian woman are actually aware of their alienated environment 
and react to it, large sections of our society are not. That is what makes Austerlitz’s 
hallucinating tour, Sansour’s mechanically reproduced self, and Hanna Arendt’s own 
ancient persona—sounding a strong Selbstdenken, or critical thinking—our liberating 
pathfinders. In fact, in all of them this Selbstdenken takes up the shape of a wedged 
opening, an in-between, an interstice, a mathematical interval that contains infinitely 
divisible quantities as yet un-thought and yet perfectly thinkable. Is this irreducible 
caesura a locus, really a non-locus, as undecidable as the Marx’s “specter” of Derrida’s 
invention?  If so, doesn’t this moving locus of freedom also interpret Hannah Arendt’s 
definition of politics—the project of the polis—as freedom or, as Jerome Kohn puts it, as 
her wanting to be free?   
 In Specters of Marx, Derrida makes a pun on ontologie and hauntologie (Derrida 
1994, p. 51). Just as in his reflection Marxism haunts capitalism, so does, we evince from 
Sansour’s art, the Palestinian Resistance—irreducible as it is–unsettle Zionism. 
Derrida’s pun might have not surprised Hanna Arendt, whose disgust with the brand of 
Zionism she combated with all her passion and intelligence, clearly testimonies to how 
unsettling to her idea of freedom this version of rapacious Jewish nationalism had 
become by 1948.4 Jerome Kohn beautifully frames her vocal yearning as the voice of a 
Jewess, a Jewish woman, through whose imagination we see, so to speak, an X-ray of 
common human world, a world that is different from and, in every sense that matters, 
appears more real than the one in which we live today (p. XXIX). Here again returns the 
yearning of the Waschbär, the painters, the philosophers, and the Palestinian woman 
clearly all stuck in the panopticon but all of whom this notwithstanding—just like 
Arendt–are protagonists on the stage of their respective dramas and all of them want to 
be free.  
 A particular caesural break, however, seems to stand in the way on the path to 
freedom. As human introspection transforms the nocturnal creatures into protagonists 
on the world stage, so human judges recede into the critical role of viewers and, as 
Hannah Arendt pointed out in her 1975 talk, with the ability to act as judges and induce 
                                                          
4 For an interesting discussion of Hanna Arendt and Arab political culture, see Jens Hanssen’s article 
Translating Revolution: at http://www.hannaharendt.net/index.php/han/article/view/301/437). 
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philosophical self-judgment into the person judged. Nocturama viewers may appear at 
first frozen into inaction, but, in truth, they are well in charge of their own intellectual 
faculties and discriminating powers, and are therefore not deprived of their public 
personae, which remain all along so irreducibly human. Isn’t it therefore baffling that 
something altogether paradoxical should happen when Hannah Arendt’s philosophical 
introspection, far from transforming the native population of Palestine, or Palestinians, 
into protagonists and judges, actually turns them into “extras” with no public persona to 
wield and no inalienable private self to return to? As we leaf through the pages of her 
‘Jewish’ writings we see Palestinians rolling past our reading eyes, segment after 
segment, as voiceless, nameless, faceless, but active and rather raucous, “undecidable” 
and haunting, ontological extras each one of them in the background on the film set 
onto which they have somehow been thrown.  
 
3. Hannah Arendt, viewer of the Zionist Nocturama-Panopticon: 
 
Whenever imperialist powers did not happen to have interests, as she put it, in 
“authentic pacification” or were not “genuinely eager” to bring about a solution to the 
problems of the region, Hanna Arendt lashed out, as The Jewish Writings show, on the 
one hand, at Jewish chauvinism–with Begin’s “fascist party” and his terrorist goal of 
establishing a “Fuehrer State” in Palestine–and, on the other hand, at Arab chauvinism, 
“blind” to the successes of Zionism. She has equally unkind words for the British who, 
during the Mandate, “prevented both a working agreement between Jews and Arabs, 
which might have resulted in a rebellion against British rule and an open conflict 
between them, which might have endangered the peace of the country” (p. 425).  
 She argues, ultimately exonerating both sides, that it is the British, as Feldman 
puts it, who caused Jews and Arabs to ignore “the permanent reality of the other’s 
existence” (p. LXI). In singling out two opposite chauvinisms, both held equally 
culpable, Hannah Arendt was trying to tread a middle path. This path, however, was 
itself predicated on an entirely partisan, non-collaborative basis which was unable by its 
very nature to lead towards that common goal she had envisioned for a moment of 
“emancipating” both peoples from their common colonial shackles. Instead, her tout-
court embrace both morally and politically of the Yishuv and her acceptance of its 
legitimate status and her unquestioned acceptance of British and later Israeli faites 
accomplies on the ground do not exactly trace a middle path. In her 1950 Jewish 
Writings essay “Peace or Armistice in the Near East?” all she could write after the 1948 
war is, for example, that “it is remarkable how little the accomplished fact of a state of 
Israel and Jewish victories over Arab armies have influenced Arab politics.”  
 The logic of this discursive thread leads her to voice the dubious statement: “It 
seems as though the one argument the Arabs are incapable of understanding is force” (p. 
423). Particularly striking is her acceptance of British colonial law as binding 
international law, upon which all future settlements should legitimately be based. The 
United Nations itself, of course, followed the same logic as did and still do the major 
powers. That Arendt should find all of this congruous with her own philosophical views 
is perplexing.  In this same essay she shows no qualms about inserting a Jewish 
homeland into an imperialist reconfiguration of the Middle East (“so far, however, 
Palestine is tied to the British Empire”), preferably worked out by the British and the 
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Americans. She envisions this sort of consortium with Jewish ‘active participation’ in 
the deal since, as she writes in another essay from the same collection, “Between Silence 
and Speechlessness,” “the Jewish people have the right and the duty to say in what kind 
of world they want to live” (p. 197). It is peculiar that it never dawns on Arendt’s 
independent mind at this stage that Jewish freedom should not be pitted against 
Palestinian un-freedom, that imperialist interests by definition cannot ever interpret 
Jewish best interests, that a colonial charter like the Balfour Declaration graciously but 
gratuitously bestowed with such imperialist largesse should not carry—again—by 
definition, any moral, philosophical, legal, or political authority, much less justify the 
establishment of a national home at the expense of the native people of the area.  
 Even though she obviously came to believe that “the status of its population, both 
Jewish and Arab, is clearly that of natives,” she also realized equally obviously that 
Jewish immigrants to Palestine had acquired their “native” status quite recently, under 
extraordinary circumstances unleashed against millions of Jews–once again—by 
Europeans, not by Palestinians or Arabs. In spite of this awareness she seems to be 
surprised by the telling fact that “the Arabs have been hostile to the building of a Jewish 
homeland almost from the beginning” (p. 423).  She never completely and 
unconditionally allows Palestinians and Arabs in general to express any legitimate 
reactions, reactions which were grounded, not in the history of Europe, but in their very 
painful but all too recent Middle Eastern experience.  Because of these Western political 
and cultural prejudices together with her tacit embrace for a time of the mythology of 
the overall Euro-Zionist project in Palestine, she seems to brush aside the fact that, in an 
extraordinarily very short lapse of time, the native people of Palestine and the Middle 
East in general had suffered the traumatic end of the Ottoman Empire—an end that still 
cuts deeply into the fabric of the societies of the region. They had endured direct foreign 
rule by the British and the French, who arbitrarily portioned their lands, giving them 
borders, names, and new identities and were overwhelmed by the forceful and rapid 
take-over of Palestinian lands by a mass of foreign refugees fleeing Europe and–adding 
more salt to wounds—were shocked to the core by the UN-sponsored partition of their 
land which they, the natives, naturally resisted and fought (and are still fighting).   
 At the same time Arendt demonstrates great lucidity in pointing out the problems 
that might ensue by mishandling Jewish-Palestinian relationships, most of which have 
proved to have been on the mark. In hindsight, especially after Camp David and Oslo, it 
is hard to remain unaffected by the political clarity she showed time and again, insisting 
that “good relationships between Jews and Arabs will depend upon a changed attitude 
toward each other…not necessarily upon a formula” (p. 427). But, even these political 
stances are always predicated primarily on the more familiar Zionist terms (which she, 
as we have seen, accepted for awhile) dictated by the consolidation of the new Jewish 
homeland. They never really argue for an unconditional recognition of Palestinian 
native rights. These—deprived of their central role on the stage–are given no choice but 
to ‘be’ extras. And, such they were at the Eichmann trial, for instance, as we read in 
Letter 285 of her correspondence to Karl Jaspers.  
 In a metaphorical selfie of herself at the trial, Arendt ushers us onto the stage, 
describing without a shred of ambiguity the “human types” present in the crowd outside 
the courthouse on a descending scale that clearly remind us of the racist pseudo-science 
in pre-war Europe and America. Down this racial continuum, of course, no one is 
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spared: “On top, the judges, the best of German Jewry. Below them, the prosecuting 
attorneys, Galicians, but still Europeans.” (The italic is mine.) In this racialized view 
worthy of Lombroso, the police “looks Arabic.” “Some downright brutal types among 
them. They would obey any order.” This last comment is telling in the context of the 
Eichmann trial in which the Nazi criminal argued exactly this point in his defense. In 
her book Eichmann in Jerusalem Arendt showed her just contempt for how leniently 
the Israeli courts following this same line of reasoning had dealt with the Israeli soldiers 
who were brought to trial “for having massacred the civilian inhabitants of an Arab 
village,” Kfar Kassem (pp. 292). What is also noteworthy in those two lines quoted above 
is that now Arendt is implicating a proud Jewish institution, which because it “speaks 
only Hebrew and looks Arabic” reveals an ambivalence of character apparently 
unredeemed by the Zionist myth of Jewish regeneration in the ancient promised land. 
But this is only a prelude to the bottom line–pun intended. For, behind her and away 
from the protagonists’ lime-lights, she points out to us in that rare snapshot “the 
oriental mob, as if one were in Istanbul or some other half-Asiatic country” (Arendt 
1989, p. 435).  
 Despite this Euro-supremacist mindset, Arendt does seem to come closer to 
espousing a more genuinely democratic view.5 This happens when she envisions with 
Judah Magnes, whom she refers to as “the Conscience of the Jewish People,” a bi-
national Arab-Jewish state structured around local councils organized by both Jews and 
Palestinians. And, she underlines that the Yishuv has already accomplished its Zionist 
mandate by translating, as Feldman writes, the Jewish homeland into a political space, 
“a human world created by conscious human effort where a Jewish culture can come 
into being” (p. LX). As Feldman explains Arendt’s position on the matter, “This the 
Yishuv achieved, without political sovereignty and without being a majority in Palestine” 
(p. LX). These ideas, however, end up, again, being more tactical than anything because 
at bottom lies–during her entire interlude with Zionism—the unquestioned assumption 
that a Jewish national home should be established in Palestine, even at the cost of an 
imperialist fiat.   
 Her Western biases landed her time and again into a philosophical cul-de-sac.  
Whenever she allowed for this mindset to prevail over her rational analysis of political 
reality, she took her public mask off, happy to return to her favored and yearned-for 
status of a philosopher in hiding. This is exactly what happened after 1950. Piterberg 
says that “The building of a separate Jewish economy by the mainstream labor wing of 
Zionism– which had been its pride–she saw as the curse that made possible the 
expulsion of the Arabs (‘almost 50 percent of the country’s population’) without loss to 
the Jews.” He quotes her as saying, “A home that my neighbor does not recognize and 
respect is not a home” (Piterberg 2007, p. 52).  
 Interestingly historian of Jewish political thought, Noam Pianko, argues that “her 
work on totalitarianism shared [Hans] Kohn’s critique of ‘tribal nationalism’ and hailed 
the ‘decline of the nation-state.” Here Pianko cites historian Amnon Raz Kotzkin, who 
explained that “She developed her binational views as she thought about and wrote The 
                                                          
5 For a view of Jewish thinkers on Jews as a race, see the book edited by Mitchell B. Hart, Jews and Race 
(2011). 
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Origins of Totalitarianism and should thus be considered as part of the same project, 
an attempt to implement the conclusions of her historical analysis in a concrete realm” 
(p. 175). This explains why the words ‘federation’ and ‘collaboration’ with the Palestinian 
natives of the land began to appear with greater frequency now.  
 After that date 1950, Arendt’s writing on Jewish subjects diminished and took on 
an erratic view. Hannah Arendt had given Zionism a good chance. Her interlude with 
the experiment was over, but her concern with Jewish matters continued, integral as it 
was to her continuous reflection on European culture and politics. Again, is the root 
problem of her ideological and emotional limitations vis-à-vis Palestine a certain 
bourgeois largesse?  This largesse would point in the direction of class which might 
have, if true, enabled a gracious Arendt to afford political detachment whenever she 
came too close to unpleasant public clashes, enabled her to take her public mask off and 
run back to her longed-for Philosophy’s shelter. If so, was this largesse rooted in an at-
first-sight proud and aloof Selbstdenken patronized by Ephraim Gottlieb Lessing? In 
this perspective, Lessing’s enlightened injunction and Arendt’s Epicurean philosophy-
in-hiding seem to converge into that locus wherein no mask is necessary, wherein pure 
philosophy can freely emerge unbounded, and wherein the self can be reintegrated as 
‘thisness.’ In this case, what kind of philosophical process needs to occur in the in-
between, and, what is, in her mind, the responsibility of the intellectual who finds there 
the unlimited freedom of the spirit but is per force alienated from the living organism of 
society and the world? Isn’t this, after all, what she argued later on in The Human 
Condition?  
 In her famous Prologue to that work Arendt zeroes in on man’s rebellion against 
the human condition and identifies the trouble with it in the fact that “the ‘truths’ of the 
modern scientific world view, though they can be demonstrated in mathematical 
formulas and proved technologically, will no longer lend themselves to normal 
expression in speech and thought.” She finds a caesura between knowledge (as know-
how) and thought which turns humans into “thoughtless creatures at the mercy of every 
gadget which is technically possible, no matter how murderous it is.” (p. 3). Reminiscent 
of Heidegger’s take on technology, humans are muted by it and this enslaves them. Her 
goal for the book is, therefore, to reconsider the human condition in these new 
unprecedented realities and in particular to “trace back modern world alienation, its 
twofold flight from the earth into the universe and from the world into the self, to its 
origins” (p. 6). In this view, speech matters because “wherever the relevance of speech is 
at stake, matters become political by definition, for speech is what makes man a political 
being.” (p. 3). This makes, therefore, one a public persona. Once this political being 
returns to a non-public fold after having “finished using and abusing my individual right 
to sound through the mask” and the public persona is taken off, it becomes free of 
having to sound speech.  
 Because of Arendt’s emphasis on Selbstdenken as the metaphorical setting for 
unconditional freedom and, despite Jerome Kohn’s characterization of her statements 
in the collection of The Jewish Writings as “grounded in Hanna Arendt’s Jewish 
experience” (p. XXIX), Gabriel Piterberg argues that “in fact, one of the most striking 
features of the collection is that it brings home how little Arendt was interested in 
problems of ‘Jewishness,’ conceived in a stricter or more conventional terms.” 
According to him, her focus was political “through and through.” The subjects in the 
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book, he writes, “are not so much ‘the Jewish’ as: the historical bases of anti-Semitism in 
Europe; the illusions of bourgeois assimilation; the follies and the crimes of Zionism, 
from the 1890s to the 1960s.” After referencing both Gershom Scholem’s statement 
according to which Arendt did not particularly ‘love the Jewish People’ and Golda Meir’s 
belief not in god but in the Jewish people, he concludes that “Arendt lacked not only the 
conventional cultural patriotism that Scholem evokes, but any predilection for identity. 
In that sense, the Jewish question never ceased to bore her, she was too steeped in 
German high culture for it to mean very much.”  
 In the end, Piterberg concludes by saying that “viewed historically, Arendt’s 
writing on Zionism would seem to form a virtually self-contained episode in her career.” 
In his view, what terminated her concern with it were the “creation of a militarized and 
sectarian Zionist state of Israel, which leveled to the ground her hopes for a just solution 
in the region; and the petrification of the Stalinist state in Russia” (p. 55). Though 
Piterberg makes a good case for Arendt’s interlude with Zionism as a “self-contained 
episode,” his argument regarding Arendt’s Jewishness is less convincing. We know, in 
fact, that she questioned neither her own Jewishness nor the role Jews played in 
European history. True, Hannah Arendt’s stance is eminently political. It is the primacy 
of politics, indeed, that really mattered to her beyond any narrower ‘mystical,’ and 
therefore, nationalist, racist, and outright fascist affiliation.   
 During the oppressive fascist night that fell over Europe die Zerstoerung der 
Vernuft, as Georg Lukacs put it, the destruction of Reason became the focus of critical 
analysis on the part of European intellectuals. In 1944 Adorno and Horkheimer 
pondered in their Dialectic of the Enlightenment (2002) the causes for its “self-
destruction” and proposed that “its relapse into mythology had to be sought … in the 
fear of truth which petrifies enlightenment itself” (p. XVI).  This leads to fascism and, we 
may add in Arendt’s view, the kind of Zionism tried out on Palestinian soil. 
Selbstdenken had put an end to her Zionist interlude. But, what of the creatures of the 
night now? How does the donning and the taking off of the mask work for them? Can 
the great poet Virgil perchance help them? 
 
4. Arendt, Broch and the poetic articulation of Freedom: 
 
Hermann Broch also revisited the human condition and he did it in a very literal 
nocturama in his The Death of Virgil, a work partly written—we should point out—in a 
Nazi concentration camp, the quintessential panopticon of our times. Here, the author, 
who imagines a Virgil on the last day of his life, meditates on the European catastrophe. 
Writing in 1946 for The Nation about the genesis of the book in an essay titled “No 
Longer and Not yet,” Hannah Arendt wrote that “The event which made Broch a poet 
seems to have coincided with the last stage of darkening in Europe. When the night 
arrived, Broch woke up.” What did the nationalist and, specifically, fascist reversal look 
like then in his poetic re-presentation? When the night fell, she went on, “He awoke to a 
reality which so overwhelmed him that he translated it immediately into a dream, as is 
fitting for a man rooted in the night. This dream is The Death of Virgil” (p. 160). Arendt 
seemed to have found in Broch’s work the same chiaroscuro texture and the same 
reversal of reality we found in Sebald’s nocturama and, which is the same, in Sansour’s 
Israeli-built panopticon.  Writing of Broch and Virgil as creatures of the night, she 
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pondered similarly what nocturnal creatures would do once the overturning of that 
falsch reality suddenly occurs. Arendt individuated in the work of the Austrian writer a 
historical caesura that she describes as “this gap, this opening of an abyss of empty 
space and empty time” ushered in during 1914 and poetically refracted into the work of 
Proust and Kafka with a Broch inserted in-between as the missing link. In fact, “this 
book is by itself the kind of bridge with which Virgil tries to span the abyss of empty 
space between the no longer and the not yet.” These terms in turn extend the metaphor 
further as “no longer alive and not yet dead; and the task is the conscious achievement 
of judgment and truth” (p. 161).   
 As the Waschbär draws in philosophers’ and painters’ eyes, thereby enabling 
judgment and self-judgment, so does Sansour’s imposed falsch reality. This compels an 
external viewer to become a participant and see the caesura between falsch and unfalsch 
reality through the actors’ eyes themselves. In so doing these personae restore their own 
public historical agency through art and become protagonists–and not just in name. 
Virgil’s dilemma, which reaches its climax in the dialogue between the poet and 
Octavian Augustus, seems to parallel Arendt’s preoccupation with her paradoxical mask 
in the form of the caesura of the opening of an “abyss of empty space and empty time.” 
Arendt zooms onto Virgil as he is carried in his litter through the streets crowded with 
the Roman mob and artists “greedy with idolatry, caring only for themselves, and 
excluded from all true community, which is based on helpfulness.” (p. 161). Do these 
words hearken back to the clash she had with the Zionist mob in Massachusetts, 
supporters of Begin and his terrorist group? Both mob and artist in Broch’s narrative 
are, Arendt recalls, “intoxicated with loneliness.”  She goes on to comment that they are 
treacherous and unconcerned with the truth, unreliable and “in need of forgetting 
reality” through circus games, and—recalling Broch’s words—both are intoxicated with 
“empty forms and empty words.” The Virgil re-presented by Hermann Broch walks the 
tightrope thrown upon the caesura of the ‘no longer and not yet,’ an abyss that cannot be 
bridged by beauty and is therefore doomed to vulgarity. Only a sacrifice, the burning of 
his Aeneid—subsequently averted by the realization that this act would be made, Arendt 
notes, only for the “salvation of the soul, out of anxiety about the self, for the sake of the 
symbol”—suddenly looms as the only escape through which “the poet may still perceive 
the promised land of reality and human fellowship” (p. 162). Art–Broch’s Virgil 
discovers–has a redeeming role to play and cannot serve the interests of nationalistic 
propaganda. Is this the same kind of relentless but apparently pointless meditative 
activity the Waschbär engages in, in the midst of piercing intelligent eyes of artists and 
philosophers, both human and non-, longing for the same rupture of falsch reality of 
which they desperately hope to be free? Is this the same message conveyed by the 
Palestinian woman walled-in in her Israeli skyscraper? Is it the same human condition 
we all experience in our panopticon of Western societies, ‘democratic’ and yet under 
surveillance?  
 “No Longer and Not yet,” now a piece in the collection titled Essays in 
Understanding (1994), conveys the same philosophical longing that Arendt shared 
publicly in 1975 in Denmark.  There she makes the point she revisited in her Danish 
speech about judgment and self-judgment when she pointed out that the subject of 
Broch’s novel is death as “the ultimate achievement of man” either as moment of truth 
about one’s entire life or “in the sense that it is then one passes judgment upon one’s 
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own life.” She quickly added that “This judgment is not self-accusation, for it’s too late 
for that nor self-justification, for it is, in a way, too early for that.” Death, then, is “the 
ultimate effort to find the truth, the last definitive word for the whole story” (p. 161). 
This Arendt accomplished three decades later in Denmark, eerily the year of her death.  
At the end of the essay, in a lyrical passage evoking Broch’s last page of the novel, she 
recaptures Virgil’s approaching death on “the boat ride down to the depths of the 
elements when gently, one after another, the friends disappear, and man returns in 
peace from the long voyage of freedom into the quiet waiting of an inarticulate universe” 
(p. 162). In the words of her speech then, Virgil now turned Arendt, can finally take off 
his mask and return free into the quiet waiting and, in the words of W. G. Sebald, 
“beruhigt in den Schlaf sinken.”  
 Broch’s Virgil had already spoken early on in the book of the name in almost the 
same vein in which Arendt did with the mask.  For him “the name is like a garment 
which does not belong to us; we are naked beneath our name, more naked than the child 
that the father has lifted from the ground in order to give him a name.” The name 
necessarily functions as a bridge over the abyss of the ‘no longer and not yet.’ Broch 
adds, “the more we imbue the name with being, the stranger it becomes to us, the more 
detached it becomes from us, the more forsaken we ourselves.” The dialectic between 
name—which imbues us, as Arendt would say, with a public persona or mask and which 
makes us identifiable—and private philosophizing-self which makes us, in her view, 
definable, yields the “word beyond speech,” and it is this dialectic that engenders 
freedom. Broch brings this to a climax, “The name we bear is borrowed, borrowed the 
bread we eat, borrowed we ourselves, held naked into the unknown, and only he who 
puts off from him all borrowed furbelows, only he will glimpse the goal, he will be 
summoned to the goal so that he may ultimately join himself to his name” (p. 61).  
 In this manner Virgil is able to escape from an imperially imposed unfalsch 
reality mindful of the fact that “‘your path is poetry, your goal is beyond that of poetry.’ 
The goal lay beyond the darkness,” beyond the chiaroscuro structure of our 
nocturama/panopticon world (p. 60). When death finally comes to Virgil, Arendt 
concludes, it is a happy one, because he has found the bridge spanning the abyss 
between the “’no longer and the not yet’ of history,” the true promised land of reality and 
human fellowship. Arendt seems to capture here, in the “between the ‘no longer’ of the 
old laws and the ‘not yet’ of the new saving word,” the later role of speech in The Human 
Condition. Virgil had already argued against a stunned emperor that the Roman 
Empire, our modern imperial nation state, itself hung between the “no longer and not 
yet of history.” The empire itself was transitory and, writes Daniel Weidner, “like art it is 
a parable, pointing at a world yet to come. And just like art needs a sacrifice, namely the 
burning of the Aeneis, so does politics” (p. 169). How not read into this juxtaposition the 
fate of all nationalisms, including that of Zionism in Palestine?  In the concluding 
paragraph of her review of Death of Virgil, Arendt’s saving word sounded through the 
mask is Broch’s “word beyond speech,” her Selbstdenken: “Not quite here but yet at 
hand; that is how it has sounded and how it would sound” (p. 162). 
 In conclusion, Sebald’s and Broch’s literary work, and Sansour’s art have offered 
the author of this essay a particular angle from which to illuminate Hanna Arendt’s 
political stance vis-à-vis the Palestinians. He has found a heuristic caesura throughout. 
Whereas all of these authors’ art belabors within definite geo-political and historical loci 
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of which they see themselves as intellectual and human products–Arendt exports a 
Western historical and ideological framework within which she roots both herself and 
her Selbstdenken to another completely different locus. Here, relying on the imperialist 
powers, she kicks the native protagonists off their own stage to sound an ideal of 
Vernuft, which she markets as universal disregarding its Western matrix. Thus, she 
hears the meditation Broch sounded through the mask of Virgil. As reworked by Broch, 
the ancient poet has found the bridge spanning the historical caesura over the 
Heideggerian Abgrund, or abyss. His work is really a gift to humanity, and no sacrifice 
has to be made to the nation or empire. Broch’s poetic achievement sheds light onto 
Arendt’s own meditation itself, converging towards a synthesis. As it turned out, 
however, in her mind, sacrifices had to be made to the Euro-Zionist nation and Western 
empire, and these sacrifices could only be the Palestinians, whom she ontologically 
demoted to the status of extras. Clearly, this was poetics for Europeans—not for 
Palestinians. Held back by her Western prejudices Arendt never found in herself enough 
Selbstdenken either to re-present the Palestinians in her choral paeana to freedom or to 
meet their ontological prae-sence in her philosophical reflection. For every step forward 
she took in this direction, she sounded many more steps backwards through her own 
mask. Her interlude with Zionism ended when, on a closer look, she recoiled before the 
Zionist nocturama, a panopticon that she saw as dooming Jews, and concluded that 
Jewishness does not need a nation state but needs instead—through Selbstdenken and 
the Brochian Virgil’s newly found poetic solution—unbounded freedom in an unfalsch 
reality, a “promised land of reality and human fellowship.” Paraphrasing Jerome Kohn, 
Arendt’s voice may have become “ever more identifiable” after her death as a voice of 
freedom and Selbstdenken for all the creatures of the night striving to get out of the 
panopticon…the Palestinians excepted.  
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